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Abstract Individuals’ preferences over opportunity sets may display “preference
for flexibility” which prescribes to gradually eliminate alternatives from a given set
until a final choice is made. One rationale for this preference for flexibility is individ-
uals’ incentive to postpone the final choice in order to better learn their underlying
preferences over basic alternatives. In this paper we show that even in the absence of
learning, preference for flexibility arises if individuals are risk-averse or, at least, are
not very risk-seeking. Thus, individual’s attitude towards risk provides yet another
rationale for preference for flexibility. One of our results is that in the absence of
learning, risk-neutral as well as risk-averse individuals display the same, maximal
preference for flexibility.
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1 Introduction
The traditional economic approach views individual choice as a contingent choice of
the best alternative from an opportunity set. In certain situations, however, the choice
is made in more than one stage. A well known example (due to Kreps 1979) is that of
making reservations at a restaurant. Prior to choosing a specific meal, an individual
chooses a restaurant, i.e., a menu, from which he will later choose a meal.
Analyzing individuals’ multi-stage choice behavior, economists have identified
individual’s desire for “flexibility” or for “freedom of choice”. In the former exam-
ple, even though the individual may prefer a menu containing only steak to a menu
containing only chicken, he may, nevertheless, strictly prefer a menu containing both
steak and chicken to either of the first two menus because it gives him greater flexi-
bility of choice in the second stage. Kreps rationalizes this choice behavior by indi-
vidual’s uncertainty about future tastes (cf. Koopmans 1964).1,2 The decision-maker
optimally postpones his choice as this allows him to learn his preferences over basic
alternatives.
Typically, individual learning requires gathering and processing relevant informa-
tion. In complex environments, however, these activities can be far beyond humans’
cognitive abilities.3 In this paper we show that even in the absence of learning, when
postponing a choice does not improve individuals’ information, there might still be
incentives to do so. In particular, individual’s attitude towards risk creates incentives
to postpone the final choice, i.e., leads to preference for flexibility. Thus, individual’s
degree of risk aversion provides yet another rationale for preference for flexibility.
We show that when the decision-maker is either risk-averse or risk-neutral, his
ranking of opportunity sets displays maximal desire for flexibility: in each selection
stage only one alternative is eliminated, all other alternatives are passed to the next
stage. When, to the contrary, the decision-maker is very risk-seeking, his ranking of
opportunity sets shows absolute flexibility aversion, and the decision-maker makes his
final choice in the very first stage by choosing only one alternative. We also show that
for all other shapes of Bernoulli utility functions, the ranking of opportunity sets may
display all intermediate degrees of preference for flexibility: in contrast to very risk-
seeking decision-makers, the choice may require more than one selection stage, and
in contrast to risk-averse and risk-neutral decision-makers, more than one alternative
must be eliminated at some stages.
We use the two-stage choice model of Kreps (1979) and extend it to multiple stages.
This allows us to abstract from “the last-stage effect” which forces a decision-maker
to choose a single alternative rather than a set thereof. Starting with an initial set of
alternatives, an individual sequentially eliminates alternatives until only one alterna-
1 Pattanaik and Xu (1990) propose a similar cardinality criterion for ranking menus in terms of “freedom
of choice”.
2 Puppe (1995, 1996) suggests a characterization of “freedom of choice” which combines individual pref-
erences over basic alternatives with individual’s desire to choose from a larger opportunity set.
3 For studies that explore the role of humans’ cognitive limitations in economics and in psychology see,
e.g., Simon (1955) and Miller (1956). For an exhaustive survey of imperfect information processing and
bounded rationality see, e.g., Lipman (1995).
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tive remains in the set. In each stage, the decision-maker decides which alternatives
he passes to the next stage, and which alternatives he eliminates.
We follow Kreps (1979) and assume that, although the decision-maker has a rational
preference relation over basic alternatives, he is uncertain about it. In each selection
stage the decision-maker gets a signal which provides him imprecise information
about his preferences. This signal can be interpreted as a result of individual’s per-
sonal perceptive comparison of alternatives, and, therefore, it represents his subjective
preference relation at that stage.
We disable learning by assuming that in each stage the decision-maker compares
opportunity sets only using a signal from that stage. We may also view this imperfect
recall feature as re-labeling of alternatives in each stage. With such an interpretation,
this reflects high complexity of the environment of a given choice problem.4 Having
observed his subjective preferences at a stage, the decision-maker compares all subsets
of the current set of alternatives and selects an optimal subset for the next stage. The
final choice is made when the subset contains only one alternative.
Puppe (1995) points out that there exists an intrinsic inconsistency between even
a “mild nontrivial preference for flexibility” and the rationality of underlying prefer-
ences. This impossibility result manifests that if preferences are rational, the ranking
of opportunity sets must be degenerate. It is the individual’s uncertainty about prefer-
ences that allows us to circumvent this impossibility result.
The literature on choice flexibility takes a normative viewpoint and does not assume
any specific information structure and any specific individual learning process. In con-
trast, we take a positive approach to preference for flexibility by assuming a particular
information structure. In our model, preference for flexibility arises in the form of indi-
vidual’s incentives to postpone the final choice by selecting an opportunity set with
multiple alternatives. We show that individual’s incentives to postpone final choices
may arise even in the absence of learning. In other words, individuals may want
to delay choices not only because they expect better information in the future, but
also because they expect different information. In the latter case, individuals’ attitude
towards risk becomes, for the chosen information structure, the only factor which
determines preference for flexibility.
The reason why different information is desirable for individuals in the middle of
a choice process is that the current set of alternatives contains intrinsic information
about ranks of all its alternatives.5 Although in the absence of learning, individuals
are not able to explicitly combine current signal with previous ones, they are still
able to implicitly combine current signal with intrinsic information that the current
sample carries. In this respect, the choice process is a process of combining intrinsic
information with the current signal in order to improve intrinsic information in the
next stage. That is why the impossibility result of Puppe (1995) does not hold here:
passing all alternatives to the next stage does not improve intrinsic information in the
next stage because the sample remains the same. Eliminating some alternatives, to the
4 Simon (1955) points out difficulties in distinguishing individuals’ cognitive limitations from environ-
mental complexities in modeling boundedly rational behavior.
5 In other words, the distribution of ranks in opportunity sets at any subsequent selection stages differs
from the ex ante uniform distribution.
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contrary, may improve that information, even though the sample will contain fewer
alternatives.
This paper can also be related to the literature on choice rationalization, in which
individuals sequentially use different rationales (preference relations over alterna-
tives) and gradually eliminate all but one alternative. One of the pioneering papers
in viewing the choice as a result of sequential elimination is of Tversky (1972). This
“choice-by-elimination” approach has recently been used in the literature on choice
rationalization and proven to be useful in rationalizing choices by multiple rationales.6
Our paper differs from this literature in that our decision-maker does not use given
rationales as choice heuristics. He does not need to follow an exogenously fixed proce-
dure of maximizing his subjective preferences over alternatives, i.e., rationales, at each
stage. We show that a decision-maker may (and will, if he is risk-averse) find it strictly
sub-optimal to select only the best (in accordance with the corresponding rationale)
alternatives at a stage. Instead, we give him the freedom to derive his preference over
subsets of alternatives and eliminate alternatives accordingly using informational links
between the rationale (signal) at a stage and the underlying preference relation over
alternatives. In this respect, we rationalize choice procedures rather than individuals’
actual choices.
For the chosen informational structure, we show that “extremely”7 risk-seeking
individuals have a unique optimal choice process: to use all the information available
at a stage in order to identify the best alternative, and to select only that best alter-
native. The final choice is made in the very first stage by using only one subjective
preference. As a result, this choice satisfies all rationality criteria and is rationalized by
classic utility maximization. On the opposite side of the spectrum, all risk-averse indi-
viduals, including risk-neutral ones, also have a unique and uniform optimal choice
process: to identify the worst alternative in the current sample and to eliminate it,
which we refer to as to “Single Worst Elimination” choice procedure. This procedure
induces choices that although satisfy transitivity, generally violate the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preferences (see Ficco et al. 2006).
Consequently, choices of risk-averse individuals are not rationalizable by utility
maximization. In the middle, choice processes of individuals, which utility functions
are neither concave nor extremely convex, can show all intermediate degrees of pref-
erence for flexibility, and, as long as these choice processes involve more than one
selection stage, the induced choices violate the Weak Axiom. In this way, we establish a
link between individual’s degree of risk-aversion and the rationality of the individual’s
choice through the degree of preference for flexibility of choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the choice
model, which is then analyzed in Sect. 3. Section 4 concludes. Appendices contain
some proofs.
6 See, for instance, Kalai et al. (2002), and Manzini, Mariotti (2007). Krause (2008) extends this framework
to intertemporal setting.
7 We define an “extremely” risk-seeking individual as an individual who gets positive utility level only by
choosing the best alternative from the initial opportunity set, and zero utility level otherwise.
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2 The choice model
A decision-maker with a rational but yet unknown preference relation over basic alter-
natives, must choose a single alternative from an initial set that consists of N > 1
alternatives.8 He makes his choice in a sequence of stages. In each stage t when the
opportunity set consists of Nt > 1 alternatives, the decision-maker observes a rank-
ing of alternatives, from 1, the best, to Nt , the worst. With probability q ∈ (0, 1),
this ranking represents his underlying true preference relation over alternatives. With
the remaining probability (1 − q), the ranking is a purely random ranking. Having
observed ranks of each of Nt alternatives, perceived ranks hereinafter, the decision-
maker selects a subset of alternatives of size Nt+1, Nt+1 = 1, . . . , Nt − 1, which
becomes his opportunity set in stage t + 1. Thus, in each stage, he decides how many
alternatives and alternatives of which ranks he selects for the next stage. This decision
represents the choice process of the decision-maker.
We prevent the decision-maker from learning by assuming that he is prospective
but not retrospective so that he cannot aggregate information from the past. In every
stage, he either does not use or does not remember signals that he has been using in
the previous stages, or, alternatively, these signals contain no relevant information at
that stage due to re-labeling. Thus, the signal that the decision-maker receives at a
stage represents all his information about his true preferences that he may use at that
stage.
When Nt = 1, the choice process is over, and the unique alternative in the oppor-
tunity set becomes the final choice of the decision-maker. The rank of the chosen
alternative within the initial set is random. By pkN we denote the probability that
the rank of this alternative is equal to k, and by the column vector pN we denote a
distribution of the rank of the finally chosen alternative:
pN =
(
p1N , . . . , p
N
N
)T
,
N∑
k=1
pkN = 1.
Probabilities pkN are determined, amongst other factors, by the choice process and are
to some extent under the control of the decision-maker.
In the standard expected utility theory framework, the risk attitude of an individual
corresponds to the shape of his Bernoulli utility function. Typically, in evaluating the
expected utility function, a risk-averse individual attaches higher weights to less favor-
able states of the world. In the limit, when the decision-maker becomes “extremely”
risk-averse, he puts all the weight to the worst possible state. In our model, the utility
levels that alternatives yield are exogenously fixed by their true ranks in the initial
set of alternatives, and the decision-maker can only affect the probabilities pN , with
which different ranks, i.e., states, occur. Hence, in our model, an extremely risk-averse
decision-maker is an individual who minimizes the probability of choosing the worst
alternative, i.e., the alternative with the highest rank. Consequently, his objective func-
8 Due to the finiteness of the initial set of alternatives, there is no necessity to make a distinction between
a preference relation and representing it utility function.
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tion FRA to be maximized can be taken to be
FRA = −pNN .
Similarly, in evaluating the expected utility function, a risk-seeking individual attaches
higher weights to more favorable states of the world. In the limit, when the decision-
maker becomes “extremely” risk-seeking, he puts all the weight to the best state.
Hence, an extremely risk-seeking decision-maker is an individual who maximizes the
probability of choosing the best alternative, and his objective function FRS can be
taken to be
FRS = p1N .
All intermediate degrees of risk-aversion in our model correspond to the objective
function of the expected utility form:
F =
N∑
k=1
pkN U (k),
where U (k) is the corresponding weakly decreasing function of the rank. This U func-
tion itself can be viewed as individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern (expected) utility
function over lotteries that the alternative of rank k yields. For notational convenience,
we denote utility function U by the row utility vector
uN = (U (1), U (2), . . . , U (N )),
where the kth element of uN is the (expected) utility derived from alternative of rank k,
i.e., (uN )1,k = U (k). The objective function of an individual with the utility function
U can now be written in a compact form as the following inner product:
F = uN pN .
An extremely risk-averse decision-maker can be represented by a concave function
U RA(k) with the corresponding utility vector:
uRAN = (0, . . . , 0,−1), i.e., U RA(k) = 0 for k = 1, . . . , N − 1
and U RA(N ) = −1.
To the contrary, an extremely risk-seeking decision-maker can be represented by a
convex function U RS(k) with the corresponding utility vector:
uRSN = (1, 0, . . . , 0), i.e., U RS(1) = 1 and U RS(k) = 0 for k = 2, . . . , N .
In each selection stage, the decision-maker ranks subsets of alternatives from the cur-
rent opportunity set in accordance with his objective function, and selects an oppor-
tunity set for the next stage.
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3 Analysis of the model
We begin the analysis by arguing that if some alternatives are eliminated at a certain
stage, these alternatives must be the alternatives that are perceived as being the worst
at that stage. The proof of this claim is trivial and, therefore, is omitted.9 Now, let
us suppose that the decision-maker has already derived his optimal choice procedure
for all numbers n ≤ N of initial alternatives, and, therefore, knows all corresponding
probabilities pn . Then, when he faces a set of N alternatives and eliminates m ≥ 1
worst-perceived alternatives, pN can be written as follows:
pN = Dmn pN−m,
where the probability transition matrix Dmn is derived in Appendix 1. Thus, when DM
eliminates mt worst alternatives at stage t, the resulting probability distribution pN
can be recursively written as follows:
pN = Dm1N1 pN1−m1 = D
m1
N1 D
m2
N2 pN2−m2 = · · · =
∏
t
Dm1N1 ,
where Nt+1 = Nt − mt . The problem of the decision-maker is to identify opti-
mal values of mt as a function of Nt and q that maximize his objective function
F = uN pN = uN
∏
t D
mt
Nt .
10
3.1 Choice process of extremely risk-averse individual
First, we consider an extremely risk-averse decision-maker who maximizes FRA =
−pNN . His optimal choice process is derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An extremely risk-averse decision-maker eliminates only the worst-
perceived alternative at a stage, i.e., m = 1. His pay-off is FRA = −(1 − q)N−1/N .
Proof of Proposition 1 Eliminating m ≥ 2 alternatives yields the pay-off FRA(m):
FRA(m) = −pNN = −(DmN pN−m)N ,1 = −
N−m∑
j=1
((
DmN
)
N , j p
j
N−m
)
.
Using the fact that (DmN )r,k = 0 for r = N and all k < N − m, and (DmN )N ,N−m =
(1 − q)(N − m)/N simplifies this expression to
FRA(m) = (DmN )N ,N−m pN−mN−m = −
(1 − q) (N − m)
N
pN−mN−m .
9 It is easy to show that by replacing an eliminated alternative by a not eliminated alternative with higher
ranks improves the distribution of ranks in the next stage in the first-order stochastic dominance sense.
10 The described selection process is stationary so that mt do not explicitly depend on t .
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Similarly, eliminating (m − 1) alternatives yields the pay-off FRA(m − 1). If, after
eliminating (m − 1) alternatives, the decision-maker eliminates one alternative at the
next stage, his pay-off will be
F˜RA(m) = −(Dm−1N pN−m+1
)
N ,1
= −(Dm−1N D1N−m+1 pN−m
)
N ,1
= −
N−m∑
j=1
(
Dm−1N D
m−1
N−m+1
)
N , j p
j
N−m
F˜RA(m) = −(Dm−1N D1N−m+1
)
N ,N−m p
N−m
N−m
= −
N−m+1∑
j=1
(
Dm−1N
)
N , j
(
D1N−m+1
)
j,N−m p
N−m
N−m
= −(Dm−1N
)
N ,N−m+1
(
D1N−m+1
)
N−m+1,N−m p
N−m
N−m
= − (1 − q
2)(N − m)
N
pN−mN−m
Clearly, F˜RA(m) − FRA(m) > 0 due to q < 1 and pN−mN−m > 0. This implies that
eliminating m ≥ 2 alternatives at a stage is strictly dominated by eliminating (m − 1)
alternatives at that stage followed by elimination of one alternative at the next stage.
Thus, elimination of m = 1 alternatives at a stage is the unique optimal choice process.
Then, the pay-off of the decision-maker is
FRA = −
⎛
⎝
2∏
Nt=N
D1Nt
⎞
⎠
N ,1
= −
2∏
Nt=N
(1 − q)(Nt − 1)
Nt
= − (1 − q)
N−1
N
.
This ends the proof. unionsq
In accordance with Proposition 1, an extremely risk-averse decision-maker follows
the Single Worst Elimination process (see Ficco et al. 2006). He makes his final choice
in (N − 1) stages by eliminating a single alternative in each stage. The reason why it
is the case is the following. In order to eliminate the worst alternative with the larg-
est possible probability, the decision-maker wants to use as many imprecise signals,
which imperfectly reveal his underlying preferences, as possible. Eliminating only
one alternative at a stage allows him to use the maximum possible number (N − 1)
of such signals in order to identify and subsequently eliminate the worst alternative.
As a result, the choice of an extremely risk-averse decision-maker shows the strongest
preference for flexibility.
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3.2 Choice process of extremely risk-seeking individual
Next, we consider an extremely risk-seeking decision-maker who maximizes FRS =
p1N . His optimal choice process is derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An extremely risk-seeking decision-maker eliminates all but one alter-
native at the very first stage, i.e., m = N − 1. His pay-off is FRS = q + (1 − q)/N .
Proof of Proposition 2 Eliminating m ≥ 2 alternatives yields the pay-off FRS(m):
FRS(m) = p1N =
(
DmN pN−m
)
1,1 =
N−m∑
j=1
((
DmN
)
1, j p
j
N−m
)
= (DmN
)
1,1 p
1
N−m
=
(
1 − (1 − q)m
N
)
p1N−m
Eliminating (m − 1) alternatives now and one alternative at the next stage yields
F˜RS(m):
F˜RS(m) =
(
Dm−1N pN−m+1
)
1,1
=
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1 pN−m
)
1,1
=
N−m∑
j=1
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1
)
1, j
p jN−m
F˜RS(m) =
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1
)
1,1
p1N−m =
N−m+1∑
j=1
(
Dm−1N
)
1, j
(
D1N−m+1
)
j,1
p1N−m
=
(
Dm−1N
)
1,1
(
D1N−m+1
)
1,1
p1N−m
=
(
q + (1 − q)C
m−1
N−1
Cm−1N
)(
q + (1 − q) C
1
N−m
C1N−m+1
)
p1N−m
=
(
1 − (1 − q)(m − 1)
N
)(
1 − 1 − q
N − m + 1
)
p1N−m
It is easy to see that FRS(m) − F˜RA(m) > 0 for all m ≥ 2:
FRS(m) − F˜RA(m) = q(1 − q)(m − 1)
N (N − m + 1) p
1
N−m > 0.
This implies that eliminating more alternatives at a stage is strictly beneficial to
the decision-maker. Thus, the only optimal choice process is to eliminate m = N − 1
alternatives at the very first stage. The pay-off of the decision-maker then is
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FRS =
(
DN−1N p1
)
1,1
= 1 − (1 − q)(N − 1)
N
= q + 1 − q
N
.
This ends the proof. unionsq
In accordance with Proposition 2, an extremely risk-seeking decision-maker
chooses the best perceived alternative right away, in the spirit of Simon’s satisficing
criterion (Simon 1955). The intuition behind this result is as follows. Elimination of
an alternative at a stage brings a risk that this alternative is the first best in the initial
sample. The probability of this event decreases with the size of the current opportu-
nity set. Consequently, the elimination of all but one alternative at the very first stage
minimizes this probability and, consequently, maximizes the chances that the chosen
alternative is the first best alternative. As a result, the choice of an extremely risk-
seeking decision-maker shows no preference for flexibility whatsoever. He makes his
choice immediately at the very first stage.
Propositions 1 and 2 shed some light on how individuals’ risk attitude affects their
incentives to postpone the final choice. Individuals’ desire to avoid the worst alter-
native, i.e., risk aversion, creates individuals’ desire for flexibility. In contrast, indi-
viduals’ desire to choose the first-best alternative, i.e., risk seeking attitude, destroys
it.
A natural question11 that arises is whether the two procedures identified by Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 are the only optimal choice processes for an arbitrary utility function.
The answer to this question is negative, and we demonstrate this in the following
example.
Example 1 Let the decision-maker choose amongst N = 4 alternatives and let him
have a utility function with the corresponding utility vector u∗4 = (1, y, x, 0), where
0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1. For four alternative choice problems, there are also four different
selection procedures:12
(a) m1 = 3, which is the procedure used by an extremely risk-seeking decision-
maker. We denote this procedure by S4→1.
(b) m1 = 2, m2 = 1, which is a procedure where two alternatives are eliminated in
stage 1, and then one more alternative is eliminated in stage 2. We denote this
procedure by S4→2→1.
(c) m1 = 1, m2 = 2, which is a procedure where one alternative is eliminated in
stage 1, and then two more alternatives are eliminated in stage 2. We denote this
procedure by S4→3→1.
(d) m1 = m2 = m3 = 1, which is the procedure used by an extremely risk-averse
decision-maker. We denote this procedure by S4→3→2→1.
It is a routine to calculate pay-offs of the individual F∗ = u∗4
∏
t D
mt
Nt for all four
selection procedures and make comparisons for q = 1/2. The results of this investi-
gation are shown in Fig. 1.
11 We thank the anonymous referee for raising this point.
12 In general, a choice from N alternatives allows for 2N−2 different selection procedures.
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x
1
y
1
0 3/1
3/2
11/2
11/5
1234 →→→S
134 →→S
14→S
124 →→S
Fig. 1 Regions of parameters x and y, for which each selection procedure is optimal
Depending on values of x and y, i.e., on the utility function of the decision-maker,
any choice process can be optimal. In general, individuals may display not only max-
imal or no preferences for flexibility but also all intermediate degrees (the proce-
dure S4→2→1 is an example where two alternatives are kept and the other two are
eliminated). Moreover, the preference for flexibility of a given individual may depend
on the number of alternatives in the current sample. If, for example, S4→3→1 is the
optimal choice process of an individual, he displays the maximal preference for flex-
ibility facing N = 4 alternatives, and, at the same time, he displays no preference for
flexibility facing N = 3 alternatives. It points out potential difficulties in trying to rank
individuals’ choice procedures with respect to degrees of preference for flexibility.
Interestingly, there exists a convex utility function with x = 2/11 and y = 5/11,
for which all four procedures are pay-off equivalent. Thus, an individual with such a
utility function is indifferent between all procedures, all choice processes are optimal,
i.e., rationalizable, and his preference for flexibility remains undetermined.
Another interesting observation is that for values y ≥ 0.5(x + 1) and x ≥ 0.5y,
which correspond to concave and linear utility functions and which are denoted in
Fig. 1 by vertically shaded area, procedure S4→3→2→1, i.e., Single Worst Elimination,
is strictly better than any other procedure. To the contrary, for values y ≤ 0.5(x + 1)
and x ≤ 0.5y, which correspond to convex utility functions and which are denoted
in Fig. 1 by horizontally shaded area, any of the procedures can be optimal, includ-
ing S4→3→2→1. Thus, all risk-averse and risk-neutral individuals in our model make
choices in the same way, whereas risk-seeking individuals may differ in a way they
make their choices thereby displaying all possible degrees of preference for
flexibility.
From a procedural point of view, Example 1 shows that the expected utility max-
imization rationalizes different choice processes, depending on individuals’ attitudes
towards risk. In particular, a sequential maximization of multiple rationales, the pro-
cedure that is often used in the literature on choice rationalization, is rationalizable
but only for relatively risk-seeking individuals. If an individual is risk-averse, the
sequential maximization of multiple rationales is not justified by the expected utility
maximization.
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3.3 Choice process of a risk-averse individual
A natural question that Example 1 poses is whether the optimality of elimination of
the single worst for weakly risk-averse individuals can be generalized for all other
values of N and q. Here we answer this question in the affirmative.
We begin with a decision-maker whose utility function U K (k) is weakly decreasing
and weakly concave, and which is represented by a utility vector uKN :
uKN ≡ (0, . . . , 0,−1,−2, . . . ,−K + 1,−K ).
In other words, (uKN )1,k = 0 for k = 1, . . . , N − K and (uKN )1,k = −k − K + N for
k = N − K + 1, . . . , N . For any K = 1, . . . , N − 1, U K (k) is zero for (N − K ) best
ranks and is linearly decreasing over (K +1) worst ranks. In the following proposition,
we derive the optimal choice process of such individuals.
Proposition 3 A decision-maker with a utility vector uKN , K = 1, . . . , N − 1 elimi-
nates only the worst-perceived alternative at a stage, i.e., m = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof follows the same reasoning as proofs of Proposi-
tions 1 and 2. Eliminating m ≥ 2 alternatives yields the pay-off F K (m):
F K (m) = uKN pN = uKN DmN pN−m .
Eliminating (m − 1) alternatives now and one alternative at the next stage yields
F˜ K (m):
F˜ K (m) = uKN Dm−1N D1N−m+1 pN−m .
We define:
E KN (m) ≡
mCmN
(1 − q)q
(
F˜ K (m) − F K (m)
)
= mC
m
N
(1 − q)q u
K
N
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1 − DmN
)
pN−m .
In Appendix 2 we show that E KN (m) can be written as follows:
E KN (m) = g(K , m, N ) pN−m,
where the row vector g(K , m, N ) = (g1, . . . , gN−m) has the following components:
gk(K , m, N )
= k
( N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )(Cr−k−1r−1 Cm−r+kN−r − Cr−kr−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r
) − C0k−N+K Cm−1N
)
.
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In the rest of the proof that we have placed in Appendix 3, we show that
g(K , m, N ) ≥ 0 and for some k gk(K , m, N ) > 0, for any N ≥ 3, m = 2, . . . , N −1,
and K = 1, . . . , N − 1. Together with pN−m 	 0, which holds for any N − m ≥ 1
and q ∈ (0, 1), this implies that E KN (m) > 0 and, hence, F˜ K (m) > F K (m). There-
fore, eliminating m ≥ 2 alternatives at a stage is strictly dominated by eliminating
(m −1) alternatives at that stage followed by elimination of one alternative at the next
stage. Thus, elimination of m = 1 alternatives at a stage is the unique optimal choice
process. unionsq
In accordance with Proposition 3, not only extremely risk-averse individuals dis-
play the maximal desire for flexibility, but also individuals with weakly decreasing
utility function that is linear in rank for some number of worst ranks and constant for
all the other remaining (best) ranks.
One interesting property of the system of utility vectors {uKN }, K = 1, . . . , N − 1,
is that they are linearly independent. Together with the constant vector u0N ≡
(1, . . . , 1), vectors {uKN }, K = 0, . . . , N − 1 form a basis so that a utility vector
uN that represents an arbitrary utility function U (k) can be uniquely represented by
its spectrum α ≡ (α0, . . . , αN−1):
uN =
N−1∑
K=0
αi u
K
N .
Using properties of {uKN }, in the following proposition we derive the optimal choice
process of an individual with an arbitrary concave utility function.
Proposition 4 A decision-maker with an arbitrary concave utility function U (k)
eliminates only the worst-perceived alternative at a stage, i.e., m = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4 It can be directly verified that an arbitrary utility function U (k)
yields the following spectrum of the corresponding vector uN :
α0 = U (1),
αK = 2U (N − K ) − U (N − K + 1)−U (N − K − 1), K = 1, . . . , N − 2, and
αN−1 = U (1) − U (2).
Hence, an arbitrary concave and decreasing in rank utility function U (k) has strictly
positive spectrum for K = 1, . . . , N − 1. The rest of the proof follows from Proposi-
tion 3. Eliminating m ≥ 2 alternatives yields the pay-off F(m):
F(m) = uN pN =
N−1∑
K=0
αi
(
uKN pN
)
=
N−1∑
K=0
αi
(
uKN D
m
N pN−m
)
=
N−1∑
K=0
αi F K (m).
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Eliminating (m − 1) alternatives now and one alternative at the next stage yields
F˜(m):
F˜(m) = uN Dm−1N D1N−m+1 pN−m =
N−1∑
K−0
αi
(
uKN D
m−1
N D
1
N−m+1 pN−m
)
=
N−1∑
K=0
αi F˜ K (m).
Taking the difference F˜(m) − F(m) yields:
F˜(m) − F(m) =
N−1∑
K=0
αi
(
F˜ K (m) − F K (m)
)
In accordance with Proposition 3, F˜ K (m) > F K (m) for all K = 1, . . . , N −1. On
the other hand, it is obvious that F˜0(m) = F0(m) = 1 because an individual with the
utility vector u0N ≡ (1, . . . , 1) gets a unit of utility from any procedure. This implies
that F˜(m) − F(m) > 0 and ends the proof of the proposition. unionsq
Proposition 4 shows that all risk-neutral and risk-averse decision-makers display
the same, maximal preference for flexibility—they eliminate only one alternative at
a stage. This procedure is the only rationalizable choice process as it is strictly better
than any other choice process. By the continuity argument, it also remains optimal for
small perturbations of the utility function. It can be seen in Example 1 that the region
of parameters’ values for which procedure S4→3→2→1, i.e., Single Worst Elimination,
is optimal is wider than the region of concave utilities (vertically shaded area). Thus,
the optimality of this choice process goes beyond concave utilities.
The reason that non-concave utility function might lead to more aggressive elim-
ination of alternatives is that the spectrum of the corresponding utility vector must
necessarily have a negative entry αK = 2U (N − K )−U (N − K +1)−U (N − K −1)
for some K = 1, . . . , N − 2. For such a utility vector, there will be at least one neg-
ative term in the decomposition of F˜(m) − F(m). This has a simple interpretation:
local convexity at rank K of the utility function U (k) creates the opposite incentive to
eliminate all but one alternative. The optimal procedure then results from the trade-off
between the desire to postpone the choice (due to concave segments of the utility func-
tion) and the desire to make a rapid choice (due to convex segments). Consequently,
individuals with more local convexities, and with larger convexities defined by the
absolute value of αk , will eliminate alternatives more aggressively and converge in
their choice behavior in the limit to the extremely risk-seeking individuals.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify risk attitude of an individual as the only factor which, in
the absence of learning, determines preference for flexibility. This result is obtained
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by rationalizing choice processes of individuals in the presence of imperfect recall
and under a particular information structure. Risk-averse individuals have the highest
incentive to postpone the choice and, therefore, they show the strongest preference for
flexibility: they eliminate only one alternative at a time. This suggests that risk-averse
individuals will generally take the longest time to make a decision and, therefore, will
be more sensitive to discounting. To the contrary, extremely risk-seeking individu-
als have no incentives to postpone the choice and, therefore, they show no desire for
flexibility whatsoever: they make choices immediately and seem to be not subject to
discounting. All other individuals, who are neither risk-seeking nor risk-averse, can
display all possible degrees of desire for freedom. These theoretical predictions can
be experimentally tested in a laboratory environment, as well as in field experiments.
From a normative point of view, our results justify Single Worst Elimination as a
choice process of risk-averse individuals and ask for further investigation of choices
that are induced by this selection rule.
The results also suggest that the analysis of individuals’ choice behavior does not
allow us to make a distinction between underlying risk neutrality and risk aversion.
This implies that the procedural approach to individuals’ choice that we have taken
seems to overestimate individuals’ degree of risk aversion relative to the aversion
that they show in making a choice by evaluating lotteries. This bias could also be
empirically tested.
Our results follow from the corresponding inequalities that are strict. We can, there-
fore, claim that these results are robust to small perturbations of the model’s primitives
and underlying modeling assumptions. Hence, even if learning is possible but is very
limited, if signals’ accuracies across stages are different but the differences are small,
and if there are costs associated with the timing of the final decision (discounting) but
these costs are not large, individuals’ degree of risk aversion will still positively affect
individuals’ desire for flexibility.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix 1: Derivations of D1N and its generalization D
m
N
If the rating of alternatives is correct, then pN = A1N pN−1 where A1N is the N×(N−1)
matrix with a generic (r, k)—element (A1N ) = δr,k . If the rating of alternatives is
random, then pN = B1N pN−1 where B1N is the N × (N − 1) matrix with a generic
(r, k) -element (B1N )r,k = Cr−kr−1 C1−r−kN−r /N :
A1N =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
1 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1
0 0 . . . 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
and B1N =
1
N
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
N − 1 0 . . . 0 0
1 N − 2 . . . 0 0
0 2 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . N − 2 1
0 0 . . . 0 N − 1
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
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Here Cxy is the binomial coefficient, which we define to be zero if x < 0, y <
0, or x > y. Hence, if the ranking is correct with probability q and random with
the remaining probability (1 − q), pN can be written as pN = D1N pN−1 where
D1N ≡ qA1N + (1 − q)B1N . Similarly, when the decision-maker eliminates m worst
alternatives at stage t , we define N × (N − m) matrices AmN and BmN as (AmN )rk = δrk
and (BmN )r,k = Cr−kr−1Cm−r+kN−r /CmN .
It can be directly verified that the N × (N − m) matrix DmN ≡ qAmN + (1 − q)BmN
with generic elements (DmN )r,k = qδr,k + (1 − q)Cr−kr−1 Cm−r+kN−r /CmN is indeed the
probability transition matrix so that pN = DmN pN−m by definition.
Appendix 2: Derivations of E KN (m)
First, using the definition of DmN we show that each column of D1N−m+1 has at most
two nonzero entries:
(
D1N−m+1
)
r,r
= q + (1 − q)(N − m + 1 − r)
M − m + 1 = 1 −
(1 − q)r
N − m + 1 and
(
D1N−m+1
)
r,r−1 =
(1 − q)(r − 1)
N − m + 1
Then, we calculate the product Dm−1N D1N−m+1:
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1
)
r,k
=
(
Dm−1N
)
r,k+1
(
D1N−m+1
)
k+1,k +
(
Dm−1N
)
r,k
(
D1N−m+1
)
k,k
=
(
qδr,k+1 + (1 − q)
Cm−1N
Cr−k−1r−1 C
m−r+k
N−r
)(
(1 − q)k
N − m + 1
)
+
(
qδr,k + (1 − q)
Cm−1N
Cr−kr−1C
m−1−r+k
N−r
)(
1 − (1 − q)k
N − m + 1
)
Using the above expression, E KN (m) can now be written as follows:
E KN (m) =
mCmN
(1 − q)q u
K
N
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1 − DmN
)
pN−m = g(K , m, N ) pN−m,
where we define g(K , m, N ) as follows:
g(K , m, N ) = (g1, . . . , gN−m) ≡ mC
m
N
(1 − q)q u
K
N (D
m−1
N D
1
N−m+1 − DmN ).
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The kth component gk of g can be simplified in the following way:
gk = mC
m
N
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
((
DmN
)
r,k −
(
Dm−1N D
1
N−m+1
)
r,k
)
= mC
m
N
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
(
qδr,k + 1 − qCmN
Cr−kr−1C
m−r+k
N−r
)
− mC
m
N
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
(
qδr,k+1 + (1 − q)
Cm−1N
Cr−k−1r−1 C
m−r+k
N−r
)
× (1 − q)k
N − m + 1 −
mCmN
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
×
(
qδr,k+1 + (1 − q)
Cm−1N
Cr−kr−1 C
m−1−r+k
N−r
)(
1 − (1 − q)k
N − m + 1
)
and then:
gk(K , m, N ) = mC
m
N
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
×
(
(1 − q)
CmN
Cr−kr−1 C
m−r+k
N−r −
(1 − q)
Cm−1N
Cr−kr−1C
m−1−r+k
N−r
)
+ mC
m
N
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r +K −N )
(
qδr,k + (1 − q)
Cm−1N
Cr−kr−1 C
m−1−r+k
N−r
)
× (1 − q)k
N − m + 1 −
mCmN
(1 − q)q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
×
(
qδr,k+1 + (1 − q)CmN
Cr−k−1r−1 C
m−r+k
N−r
)
(1 − q)k
N − m + 1
= 1
q
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
(
mCr−kr−1C
m−r−k
N−r
− (N − m + q)Cr−kr−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r
)
+ k
q
(1 − q)
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
(
Cr−kr−1 C
m−1−r+k
N−r
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− Cr−k−1r−1 Cm−r+kN−r
)
− C0k−N+K Cm−1N
= k
( N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )(Cr−k−1r−1 Cm−r+kN−r
− Cr−kr−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r
) − C0k−N+kCm−1N
)
.
Appendix 3: Proof of g(K, m, N) ≥ 0
We define
hk(K , m, N ) ≡
N∑
r=N−K+1
(r + K − N )
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r
)
,
so that gk(K , m, N ) = k(hk(K , m, N ) − C0k−N+K Cm−1N ), and consider K hk
(K , m, N ):
K hk(K , m, N ) ≡ hk(K + 1, m, N ) − hk(K , m, N )
=
N∑
r=N−K
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r
)
.
For z = 0,K hk(K , m, N ) can be written as
K hk(K , m, N ) =
N∑
r=N−K
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r−z − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r−z
)
+ CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x .
Suppose that the above equality holds for some z ≥ 0. Then, it also holds for (z+1)
as:
khk =
N∑
r=N−K
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r−z − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r−z
)
+ CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
=
N−1∑
r=N−K−1
(
Ckr C
m−r+k
N−r−(z+1) − Ck−1r Cm−1−r+kN−r−(z+1)
)
+ CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
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=
N∑
r=N−K−1
((
Ckr−1 + Ck−1r−1
)
Cm−r+kN−r−(z+1) −
(
Ck−1r−1 + Ck−2r−1
)
Cm−1−r+kN−r−(z+1)
)
+ CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
=
N∑
r=N−K−1
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r−(z+1) − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r−kN−r−(z+1) + Ck−1r−1 Cm−r+kN−r−z
− Ck−1r Cm−1−r+kN−r−z−1
)
+ CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
khk =
N∑
r=N−K−1
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r−(z+1) − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r−(z+1)
)
+
N−1∑
r=N−K−2
Ck−1r Cm−r−1+kN−r−z−1 −
N∑
r=N−K−1
Ck−1r Cm−1−r+kN−r−z−1 + CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
=
N∑
r=N−K−1
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r−(z+1) − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r−(z+1)
)
+ Ck−1N−K−2Cm−N+K+1+kK+1−z + CkN−K−1
z−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
=
N∑
r=N−K
(
Ckr−1C
m−r+k
N−r−(z+1) − Ck−1r−1 Cm−1−r+kN−r−(z+1)
)
+ CkN−K−1
(z+1)−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x
By induction, it holds for z = K . Hence, for all k = 1, . . . , N − m:
K hk = CkN−K−1
K∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x = CkN−K−1
(K−1∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x + C N−m−k+11
)
= CkN−K−1
(K−2∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x + C N−m−k+12
)
= · · · = CkN−K−1
×
(K−K∑
x=0
C N−m−kK−x + C N−m−k+1K
)
= CkN−K−1C N−m−k+1K+1
Now gk(K , m, N ) can be written as follows:
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gk(K , m, N ) = k
(
hk(K , m, N ) − C0k−N+K Cm−1N
)
= k
(K−1∑
z=1
khk(z, m, N ) + hk(1, m, N ) − C0k−N+K Cm−1N
)
= k
(K−1∑
z=0
CkN−z−1C
N−m−k+1
z+1 − C0k−N+K Cm−1N
)
It is easy to see that gk(K , m, N ) ≥ 0 for all K < N − k as C0k−N+K = 0 in this
case. Moreover, gk(K , m, N ) > 0 for k = N − m.
In the rest of this proof we show that gk(K , m, N ) ≥ 0 for all K ≥ N − k. It is
easy to see that gk(K , m, N ) is independent of K for K ≥ N − k:
(gk(K , m, N ))K≥N−k = k
(K−1∑
z=0
CkN−z−1C
N−m−k+1
z+1 − Cm−1N
)
= k
( N−k−1∑
z=N−k−m
CkN−z−1C
N−m=k+1
z+1 − Cm−1N
)
.
Hence, for all K ≥ N − k, gk(K , m, N ) = kt (k, m, N ), where
t (k, m, N ) =
N−k−1∑
z=N−k−m
CkN−z−1C
N−m−k+1
z+1 − Cm−1N .
We will show that t (k, m, N ) is independent of k. To this end, we consider the
difference k t (k, m, N ) ≡ t (k + 1, m, N ) − t (k, m, N ):
k t (k, m, N ) ≡ t (k + 1, m, N ) − t (k, m, N )
=
N−k−2∑
z=N−k−m−1
Ck+1N−z−1C
N−m−k−1+1
z+1 −
N−k−1∑
z=N−k−m
CkN−z−1C
N−m−k+1
z+1
=
N−k−1∑
z=N−k−m
(
Ck+1N−zC
N−m−k
z − CkN−z−1C N−m−k+1z+1
)
For x = 1,k t (k, m, N ) can be written as
k t (k, m, N ) =
N−k−x∑
z=N−k−m
(
Ck+1N−z+1−x C
N−m−k
z − CkN−z−x C N−m−k+1z+1
)
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Suppose that the above equality holds for some x ≥ 1. Then, it also holds for (x +1)
as:
k t (k, m, N )
=
N−k−x∑
z=N−k−m
(
Ck+1N−z+1−x C
N−m−k
z − CkN−z−x C N−m−k+1z+1
)
=
N−k−x∑
z=N−k−m
(
Ck+1N−z+1−(x+1)C
N−m−k
z − CkN−z+1−(x+1)C N−m−k+1z
)
=
N−k−(x+1)∑
z=N−k−m
Ck+1N−z+1−(x+1)C
N−m−k
z −
N−k−x∑
z=N−k−m+1
CkN−z+1−(x+1)C
N−m−k+1
z
=
N−k−(x+1)∑
z=N−k−m
(
Ck+1N−z+1−(x+1)C
N−m−k
z − CkN−z+(x+1)−(x+1)C N−m−k+1z+1
)
By induction, it holds for x = m and, therefore,
k t (k, m, N ) =
N−k−m∑
z=N−k−m
(
Ck+1N−z+1−m − C N−m−kz CkN−z−mC N−m−k+1z+1
)
= Ck+1k+1 − Ckk = 0.
Thus, t (k, m, N ) = t (N − m, m, N ) which is
t (N − m, m, N ) =
m−1∑
z=0
C N−mN−z−1C
1
z+1 − Cm−1N
=
m∑
z=1
Cm−zN−zC
1
z −
m∑
z=1
Cm−zN−z =
m∑
z−2
Cm−zN−zC
1
z−1 > 0.
Hence, t (k, m, N ) = t (N − m, m, N ) > 0, gk(K , m, N ) = kt (k, m, N ) > 0 for
all K ≥ N −k, and, consequently, g(K , m, N ) ≥ 0 with gk(K , m, N ) > 0 for some k.
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